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THE CHILD AS A WITNESS
HON. CHARLES F. STAFFORD*
Most parents will agree that small children have an uncanny ability
of being in strange places at unexpected moments. Children are often
in the right place at the right time to see people, things and events that
are never witnessed by adults. As we know from experience, they often
overhear things that adults have felt were said in confidence or were
said because they felt there were no witnesses. While this faculty is
often a mere source of annoyance to the adult members of the family,
it may have considerable impact upon the outcome of some legal action.
Unfortunately, the child's tendency to wander also places him in
out-of-the-way places where he may have crimes committed against
his person. As a result, the child may be the only witness available to
the state in prosecuting a crime. The prosecuting attorney will then be
faced with the difficult task of establishing that child's competency as a
witness. For all practical purposes, it will be necessary to determine
whether his testimony will enhance or stay the cause of justice.'
COMPETENCY
What elements determine the competency of the child witness?
It was recognized in England as early as 1778 that children could be
competent witnesses in criminal trials. In the leading case of Rex v.
Brasier, it was announced:
... [T]hat an infant, though under age of seven years, may be sworn
in a criminal prosecution, provided such infant appears, on strict
examination by the Court, to possess a sufficient knowledge of the
nature and consequences of an oath... for there is no precise or fixed
rule as to the time within which infants are excluded from giving
evidence; but their admissibility depends upon the sense and reason
they entertain of the danger and impiety of falsehood, which is to be
collected from their answers to questions propounded to them by the
*Judge of the Superior Court, Skagit County, Washington.
SvWheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 526 (1895).
2 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779). For a discussion of the historical develop-
ment of this rule in the British Commonwealth, see Children as Witnesses, 100 SOL. J.
904 (1956).
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court; but if they are found incompetent to take an oath, their testi-
mony cannot be received.. .. 3
In 1895 the United States Supreme Court established the policy
followed by most of the state courts thereafter. In Wheeler v. United
States" it was held that a five and one-half year old child was competent
to testify in a criminal trial for murder. The Court held:
... [T]he boy was not by reason of his youth, as a matter of law,
absolutely disqualified as a witness .... While no one would think of
calling as a witness an infant only two or three years old, there is no
precise age which determines the question of competency. This
depends upon the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation
of the difference between truth and falsehood, as well as of his duty to
tell the former. The decision of this question rests primarily with the
trial judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and may resort to any
examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence,
as well as his understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of
these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of
the trial judge will not be disturbed on review, unless from that which
is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous .... 1
Generally the rule of the Wheeler case has been adopted by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court.
RCW 5.60.050 provides in part as follows:
"The following persons shall not be competent to testify: ... (2) Chil-
dren under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just
impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of
relating them truly." It should be noted that this statute imposes no
lower age limit for a child's capacity to testify. In Washington, tender
years alone are not a ground for refusing to permit a witness to testify.'
Intelligence and not age is the proper test by which the competency of
an infant witness must be determined.7 Where it appears that a child
has sufficient intelligence to receive just impressions of the facts re-
3 1 Leach 199, 200, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 203 (1779).
4 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524 (1895).
5 Id. at 526.
6 State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 584, 232 Pac. 353, 354 (1925).
7 State v. Collier, 23 Wn.2d 678, 683-89, 162 P.2d 267, 270-75 (1945); State v.
Smith, 3 Wn2d 543, 552, 101 P.2d 298, 301 (1940) ; State v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 273,
163 Pac. 759 (1917) ; Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 453, 117 Pac. 227-28
(1911) ; 58 Am. JuR. Witness § 129 (5th ed. 1948) ; 3 JoNEs, EVIDENCE § 757 (5th ed.
1958) [hereinafter cited as 3 JoNEs]; 1 UNDERHILL, CIMINAL EVIDENCE § 257 (5th
ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as 1 UNDERHILL]; 3 WHARTON, CRrIN. EVIDENCE §
762 (12th ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as 3 WHARTON] ; 2 WVIGmoRE, EVIDENcE § 505
(3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGmORE]; 16 Am. & ENG. EN Cy. LAw § 270
(2d ed.).
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specting which he is to testify, has sufficient capacity to relate them
correctly and has received sufficient instruction to appreciate the nature
and obligations of an oath, he should be permitted to testify,8 no matter
what his age.
By applying the foregoing test, the Washington court has considered
children of the age of nine to be competent witnesses,10 as well as those
of the age of eight," seven," six," and five." Such testimony has been
admitted in cases ranging from rape, carnal knowledge" and indecent
liberties 7 to murder, 8 as well as in civil actions.' On the other hand,
the court has also held that children of similar tender years were not
competent to testify." However, in each case the determination of
competency or lack thereof was made on the basis of intelligence or
ability to truly relate the facts rather than upon the ground of age.2'
Although Washington has not yet been faced with the problem, the
appellate courts of most states have held that four years of age is about
the absolute minimum at which a child will be considered competent to
testify."
8 State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn.2d 686, 688, 171 P.2d 845, 847 (1946) ; State v. Whit-
field, 129 Wash. 134, 139, 224 Pac. 559, 562 (1924) ; State v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 273,
163 Pac. 759 (1917); State v. Bailey, 31 Wash. 89, 71 Pac. 715 (1903) ; Kalberg v.
The Bon Marche, supra note 7; 58 Am. Ju. Witnesses § 129 (1948) ; 1 UNDERHILL §
257; 3 WHAPTON § 762; 2 WIGMORE § 506.
1 Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 454, 117 Pac. 227 (1911) ; 58 AM. Ju.
Witnesses § 129 (1948) ; 1 UNDERHILL § 257; 3 WHARTON § 762; 2 WIGMORE § 505.
10 State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn.2d 686, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); State v. Gruber, 150
Wash. 66, 272 Pac. 89 (1928) ; State v. Whitfield, 129 Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924) ;
Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, supra note 9; State v. Myrberg, 56 Wash. 384, 105 Pac.
622 (1909).
11 State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn.2d 686, 171 P,2d 845 (1946); State v. Collier, 23
Wn.2d 678, 162 P.2d 267 (1945) ; State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 232 Pac. 353 (1925);
State v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 163 Pac. 759 (1917).
12 State v. Collier, supra note 11.
13 Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 117 Pac. 227 (1911). (6 at the
time of the accident and 9 at the time of testifying).
14 State v. Smith, 3 Wn.2d 543, 101 P.2d 298 (1940). In this case the testimony
was stricken because the child later proved to be unable to meet the test of intelligence
during her actual testimony. However, age was not the reason for exclusion. Wheeler
v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895). (5Y2 at the time of giving the testimony).
Is State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 232 Pac. 353 (1925) ; State v. Myrberg, 56 Wash.
384. 105 Pac. 622 (1909).
10 State v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 163 Pac. 759 (1917).
'7 State v. Fairbanks, 25 Wn.2d 686, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); Kalberg v. The Bon
Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 117 Pac. 227, (1911).
13 State v. Gruber, 150 Wash. 66, 272 Pac. 89 (1928); State v. Whitfield, 129
Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924).
10 Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 117 Pac. 227 (1911).0 Getty v. Hutton, 110 Wash. 124, 188 Pac. 10 (1920); Macale v. Lynch, 110
W\rash. 444, 188 Pac. 517 (1920).
21 State v. Smith, 3 Wn2d 543, 101 P.2d 298 (1940) ; Getty v. Hutton, supra note
20; Macale v. Lynch, supra note 20; 2 WIGMORE § 505.
22 See, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895) ; Jackson v. State, 239
Ala. 38, 193 So. 417 (1940) ; State v. Juneau, 88 Wis. 180. 59 N.W. 580 (1894). 58
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If the cause is heard too long after the occurrence about which the
child testifies, the rule imposed by Washington statute law, as well as
the cases previously cited, presents a practical problem. According to
the statute, the child must not only be able to relate facts truly (which
refers to the time of trial), but must have been capable of receiving
just impressions of the facts2" (which obviously refers to the time of
the event). Thus, it is possible for the child to have been much younger
or of a different mental capability at the time of the event than at the
time he is offered as a witness. On the other hand, the child may have
been more competent before the event than thereafter (such as in the
case of a serious accident involving the child's mentality).
Generally speking, Washington has followed the majority view,"
holding that the age at time of testifying governs25 (if we must be con-
cerned with age alone). However, most states hold that, with the ex-
ception of res gestae utterances,26 and seasonably made complaints of
the prosecuting witness in morals cases," the court must determine that
the child was also competent at the earlier date as well.2 This latter
point has not been decided in the Washington State Supreme Court."
Air. Jua. Witnesses § 132 (1948) ; 3 JONES § 757; 1 UxDERHmL § 257; Collins, Bond,
Youth as a Bar to Testimonial Competence, 8 ARx. L. REv. 100 (1953-54) [hereinafter
cited as 8 ARic. L. REv. 100].
23 RCW 5.60.050.
24 See, e.g., Litzkuhn v. Clark, 85 Ariz. 355, 339 P.2d 389, 392 (1959) ; Sommers v.
Deepdale Gardens 3rd Corp., 14 Misc.2d 464, 178 N.Y.S.2d 516 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958).
58 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 129 (1948) ; 3 WHARTO § 762; 2 WIGMOR § 505; 8 ARK.
L. REv. 100.
25 See Kalberg v. The Bon Marche, 64 Wash. 452, 117 Pac. 227 (1911). 58 Ams. JtUR.
Witnesses § 129 (1948) ; 3 WHARTON § 762.
26 2 JONES § 331; 3 WirARTON § 762; 6 WIamoRE § 1751; 8 ARK. L. REv. 100, 106.
27 Such complaints, when seasonably made, tend to corroborate the prosecuting wit-
ness, State v. Boyles, 196 Wash. 227, 231-32, 82 P.2d 575, 577-78 (1938) ; State v.
Griffin, 43 Wash. 591 86 Pac. 951 (1906) under the ancient doctrine of "hue and
cry," State v. Murley, 35 Wn.2d 233, 237-37; 212 P.2d 801, 804 (1949). However, the
rule excludes evidence of the details of the complaint, including the identity of the
offender and the nature of the act, and admits only such evidence as will establish
whether a complaint was made timely. State v. Murley, supra. In this regard,
State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 136 Pac. 137 (1913), is of considerable interest. The
defendant was accused of the crime of sodomy with a 2% year old infant. The prose-
cution called a witness who testified that after the crime the child made complaint. The
witness then related the details of the complaint. The court held that it was proper to
have permitted the witness to testify that the 2% year old youngster had made com-
plaint at or about the time of the alleged act. However, the court also held that it was
error to have permitted the witness to repeat the details related by the child because the
child herself could not have testified about the details due to her tender years.
28 See, e.g., Hollaris v. Jankowski, 315 Ill.App. 154, 42 N.E.2d 859 (1942) ; May-
nard v. Keough, 145 Minn. 26, 175 N.W. 891 (1920). 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 129
(1948). Unlike the res gestae utterance and the "hue and cry" complaint, the dying
declaration depends partially upon the competency of the declarant. Thus, the dying
declaration of a child who is not competent to testify is inadmissible. 3 WHARTON §
762.
29 However, this is hinted at in Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 448-49, 188 Pac.
517, 518-19 (1920).
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However, it seems logical that the majority view would be followed in
light of the statute requiring an ability to receive just impressions of
facts at the time of the event"0
A review of the subject indicates that cases involving an indecent
assault upon a child seem to receive rather special treatment. The
courts quite frequently have admitted hearsay statements of a child
tending to incriminate the defendant." Usually such statements are
justified on the basis of res gestae,3" or because they tend to show the
condition of the child at the time of the statement.3 However, some
cases leave the impression that the testimony was allowed purely
because of abhorrence of the crime involved."- The better-reasoned
cases seem to require that, with the exception of res gestae utterances,35
all hearsay statements introduced under any exception to the rule
should be made by someone competent as a witness at the time the
statement was made.3
This raises another practical problem. When hearsay statements of
young children are offered under some exception to the hearsay rule,
should the trial court determine the competency of that child at the
time of the event, even though the child is not personally offered as a
witness? Although the Washington court has not decided that point,
it would appear to be a safe course of action for the judge to take in
most cases, including those instances involving dying declarations."
3o RCW 5.60.050.
31 People v. Figuerora, 134 Cal. 159, 66 Pac. 202 (1901); 3 WHARToN § 762; 8
ARx. L. REv. 100, 106.
"2Turner v. State, 66 Fla. 404, 63 So. 708 (1913) ; Williams v. State, 145 Tex.Crim.
536, 170 S.W.2d 482 (1943); 3 WHARTON § 762; 8 A.x. L. REv. 100, 106. See
Thomas, The Problem of the Child Withwss, 10 Wyo. L. J. 214 [hereinafter cited as
10 Wyo. L. J. 214]. The true res gestae statement is not considered a statement of the
person making it, but is treated as the event speaking through the declarant. The
declaration derives credibility from the strength of the circumstances surrounding its
making, not from the competency of the person making the declaration. 1 WRARTON
§ 283. Thus, the fact that the utterance sought to be introducted as part of the res
gestae is that of a child of tender years, possibly incompetent as a witness, is not
controlling. 1 WARTON § 283. This is true whether the child is the one who suffered
the injury or was merely present at the time of an accident or the commission of a
crime. 2 JoNEs § 331. In State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 136 Pac. 137 (1913), the
supreme court held it to be error for the trial court to have permitted the witness to
detail the complaint made by the 2r/ year old victim of an indecent assault, 'there
being no contention that the remarks made by the child were any part of the res
gestae!' This seems to be a slight indication that our supreme court may follow the
majority view and allow competent third party witnesses to testify about the res
gestae statements of infants as young as 2Y/ years of age.
'3 People v. Figuerora, 134 Cal. 159, 66 Pac. 202 (1901) ; State v. Jerome, 82 Iowa
749, 48 N.W. 722 (1891); 8 ARx. L. REv. 100. 106. See 10 Wyo. L.J. 214.
34 Territory v. Godfrey, 6 Dak 46, 50 N.W. 481 (1888) ; 8 ARx. L. REv. 100, 106.
35 3 WHARTON § 762; 8 AaK. L. R v. 100, 106.38 State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101, 157 A.L.R. 1355 (1945); 3
WHARTo0 § 762; 8 Apx. L. REv. 100, 106.
'7 See 2 JoNEs § 304; 3 WHARTOx § 762; see notes 28 and 22 supra.
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It is frequently said that the trial judge has the best opportunity to
observe the child on the witness stand and thus the determination of
his competency will rest in the sound discretion of the court." How-
ever, a word of caution should be added. The trial court has only the
infant's answers to exploratory questions on voir dire as a basis to
determine competency while the appellate court will review the entire
record made by the child."0 Reversals are possible where the error
becomes apparent from the evidence given by the child even though it
could not have been foreseen by the trial court in view of a previous
show of competence." Thus, the trial judge must carry the onus of
being prescient without possessing this quality.
Therefore, the younger the child, the greater the burden upon the
court to determine his intelligence and ability to understand and relate
the truth.4 - Even though a child has initially been determined compe-
tent to testify, if his subsequent testimony proves that he lacks such
ability, his testimony should be stricken and the jury instructed to
disregard the same." This action should also be taken in the event it
becomes evident that the child lacks understanding. Furthermore,
even though the child is found to be competent, he should not be
permitted to answer questions which he might not in fact understand.
While a question may be proper for an adult, there is a danger that the
child might not know the meaning of the words and be led into making
a false answer."
The trial court should also proceed with caution when, through the
use of leading questions, it becomes evident that the answers of the
child are what his attorney thinks the facts are, rather than what the
child actually recalls." He should seriously consider striking the testi-
mony when a lapse of time has obviously erased actual impressions
38 E.g, Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524-25 (1895) ; State v. Fairbanks,
25 Wn.2d 686, 688, 171 P.2d 845 (1946); State v. Gruber, 150 Wash. 66, 272 Pac.
89 (1928) ; State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 232 Pac. 353 (1925) ; State v. Whitfield,
129 Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924). 58 Am.Ju. Witnesses § 136 (1948) ; 3 JONES §
757; 1 UNDERHILL § 257; 3 WHARTON § 743; 2 WIGmORE § 507.
39 See State v. Smith, 3 Wn.2d 543, 101 P.2d 298 (1940) ; Macale v. Lynch, 110
Wash. 444, 188 Pac. 517 (1920) ; State v. Bailey, 31 Wash. 89, 71 Pac. 715 (1903). 58
AM. JuR. Witnesses § 136.40 E.g., Macale v. Lynch, supra note 39. 8 ARK. L. Rxv. 100, 101-103.
4' State v. Smith, 3 Wn.2d 543, 551-52, 101 P.2d 298, 301 (1940).
42 State v. Smith, supra note 41; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217-18.43 Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 449, 188 Pac. 517, 519 (1920) ; 10 Wyo. L.J.
214, 217-18.
44 Riggs v. State, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247 (1956) ; 3 WHARTON § 762 (Supp.
1960).
45 See Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 188 Pac. 517, 519 (1920). 10 Wyo. L.J.
214, 220.
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from a child's mind, so that at the time of trial, he is unable to truly
relate the facts."0 He should follow the same course when it becomes
evident that the child did not originally possess the ability to observe
the events at the time they took place," or that he is presently unable
to communicate them in his testimony.," In other words, the trial court
like the appellate tribunal, must also consider the entire testimony of
the child if the judge is to be on the safe side.
However, the mere fact a child may make contradictory statements
does not, in and of itself, destroy his competency and require that his
testimony be stricken. The court may also consider the nature of the
cross-examination and how the child has reacted to it, whether the
questions were understandable, whether the child was simply embar-
rassed, whether the contradictions were material and whether they
involved major or minor issues.4 9
Once the evidence of the child is admitted, the trier of fact must
determine its probative value. Frequently, the testimony of a child
will be of doubtful value even if admitted, because of the physical
and mental limitation on the powers of an infant due to his imma-
turity."9 There is the danger that a child will intermingle imagination
with memory and thus have incorrect statements irretrievably engraved
on the record by a guileless witness with no conception that they are
incorrect"' or that the words should not have been spoken.2
40 See Macale v. Lynch, supra note 45. 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217-18.
47 See State v. Smith, 3 Wn2d 543, 551-52, 101 P2d 298, 301-02 (1940). 10 Wyo.
L.J. 214, 217-18.
48 See State v. Smith, supra note 47. 10 Wyo. LJ. 214, 217-18.
40 See State v. Priest, 132 Wash. 580, 584-85, 232 Pac. 353, 354-55 (1925) ; State
v. Smith, 95 Wash. 271, 163 Pac. 759 (1917) ; State v. Bailey, 31 Wash. 89, 71 Pac. 715
(1903).
50 10 W Vo. L.J. 214, 217-20.
513 JoxNs § 759; 8 Amu. L. R:v. 100, 105; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 220.5 2 ARK. L. REv. 100, 105-06. J. F. Stephen has the following interesting comment
to make in his discussion of the English Criminal Law: "A child will have been taught
to say that, if it tells a lie, it 'will go to the bad place when it dies' (which is usually
taken to show that it knows the meaning of an oath) long before it has any real notion
of the practical importance of its evidence in a temporal point of view; and also long
before it has learned to distinguish between its memory and its imagination, or to
understand, in the least, degree what is meant by accuracy of expression. It is hardly
possible to cross-examine a child, for the test is too rough for an immature mind.
However gently the questions may be put, the witness grows confused and frightened,
partly by the tax on its memory, partly by the strangeness of the scene; and the result is
that its evidence goes to the jury practically unchecked, and has usually greater weight
than it deserves, for the sympathies of the jury are always with it. This is a consider-
able evil, for in infancy the strength of the imagination is out of all proportion to the
power of the other faculties; and children constantly say what is not true, not from
deceitfulness, but simply because they have come to think so, by talking or dreaming
what has passed. The evil, however, is one which the law cannot remedy. It would be a
far greater evil to make children incompetent witnesses up to a certain age. The only
remedy is that the judges should insist to juries more strongly that they generally do
1962]
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The right of cross-examination is often impotent in eliciting the truth
from a child because often he will speak what is in his mind as his
impression of the truth.5" However, in all fairness, it should be stated
that this same problem is faced with many adults. Furthermore, it is
generally recognized that the natural language of a child is that of
innocence and truth, and his testimony is apt to be free from the
prejudice or sinister motives which too often affect the testimony of
adults."
In the final analysis, if the mental impression of the litigated incident
has become obscure through the passage of time or the importunities
of interested parties, the child is patently useless as an instrument of
justice.5 On the other hand, to exclude from the witness stand one who
shows himself capable of understanding the difference between truth
and falsehood and who does not appear to have been simply taught to
tell a story may sometimes result in staying the hand of justice."5 In
this regard, the judge's decision is both difficult and important to the
outcome of the litigation.
Who has the burden of proving the competency of the child witness?
There do not appear to be any Washington cases that determine who
has the burden of proving the competency of a child under the age of
ten years.57 However, the court has held generally that the party who
produces a witness has the burden of proving that he is qualified.'s
Most states apply the same rule to one who offers a child as a witness."
One can assume that such rule would undoubtedly be applied to the
question of a child's competency in this state.
Inasmuch as the one who calls an infant witness must establish his
on the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence of children, and on the danger of being
led by sympathy to trust in it"' J. F. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 287 (1863). However, the authorities are definitely not in accord
on the unreliability of childrens' testimony. Jones has this to say: "Perhaps it may be
appropriate to suggest that the reliability of a very young child as a witness may lie
in the very fact of his immaturity and lack of moral perception because of the instinc-
tive impulse to describe what he has seen and repeat what he has heard. The temptation
of misstatement comes with maturity and the realization of falsehood as an alternative
to truth. Any kindergarten teacher can vouch for this from her experience as the
recipient of revealing facts from the lips of the children as to happenings at home.
3 JONES § 757 n. 12. See also 2 Wiom0Ro § 509 wherein it is suggested that the child
should simply be placed on the stand and allowed to testify for what it is worth.5 3 Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 188 Pac. 517 (1920) ; 8 A x. L. REv. 100, 105.
54 Young v. State, 72 Ga. 838, 35 S.E.2d 321 (1945) ; 3 JoNEs § 759.5 5 Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 188 Pac. 517 (1920) ; 8 ARx L. REv. 100, 104-05.
66 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523 (1895) ; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217-18.
57 RCW 5.60.050.
5 8 Accord, Cowan v. Chicago, Milwakee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry., 55 Wnf2d 615, 622,
349 P2d 218, 222 (1960).
59 1 UNDERHILL § 257.
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competency, it is usually held that the proponent also should have the
first opportunity to question the child in an attempt to establish the
fact in question."0 The Washington cases are silent on this subject.
However, it is a rule of logic, and the court will probably follow it
when the question is presented.
Once an attorney is ready to call a child as his next witness, he
should ask to have the jury excused just as he would if he intended to
make an offer of proof in their absence. After the jury has retired,
counsel should then call the unsworn child for the purpose of establish-
ing his competency as a witness.
If opposing counsel has no objection to the youngster's competency,
he can make it known at this time. Thereafter, the jury can be
returned to the jury box, the child can be sworn in their presence, and
the case can proceed. However, if there is an objection to the witness'
competency, the matter can be raised and finally determined in the
absence of the jury.
The one who calls the child-witness should assume the initiative of
having the jury excused. He should not place him on the stand with
the vague hope that opposing counsel will not object to his competency.
An experienced opponent will seldom concede the competency of a
very young witness, especially if his testimony is important. He knows
that such a concession, in the presence of the jury, can emphasize the
child's competency too strongly in their minds. He also knows that a
sudden explosive challenge of the child's competency may leave some
doubt in the jury's mind, even after the youngster is later found compe-
tent to testify. However, the unexpected explosive attack has even
greater psychological importance. Through sheer fright, embarrass-
ment or shock, the effectiveness of the young person's ability to demon-
strate his competency may be completely neutralized before the jury
ever hears him. In this way, the value of a potentially dangerous oppo-
sition witness may be checked. Thus, by taking the lead on behalf of
his young witness, the proposing attorney can deny his opposition an
excellent opportunity for making an explosive objection in the presence
of the jury just after the child is sworn.
The duty of the court
Although the party offering a child as a witness has the burden of
proving his competency, the onus of the determination of competency
0 Linder v. State, 156 Neb. 504, 56 N.W2d 734, 741 (1953) ; 1 UNDERHILL § 257.
19621
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falls upon the trial judge. When a child is under ten years of age
(where competency is apparently presumed by statute"1), the court
must assume the initiative in determining his competency.
The preliminary examination of a child should take place at the time
he is offered as a witness,63 prior to the time he is sworn."4 It should be
conducted first by the court without interference by counsel.' There-
after, the court, in his discretion, may allow such examination by both
counsel as he feels is necessary. In a criminal prosecution, the
defendant is entitled to have the question of competency heard and
determined in his presence at the trial. In fact, it is the best policy for
a trial judge to refuse a private examination of a child even in a civil
action.67
Some authorities have held that the examination should take place
in the presence of the jury. They contend that the youngster's under-
standing of the nature of the oath and his capacity to comprehend the
distinction between right and wrong, as disclosed by his preliminary
examination, are proper matters to be considered in determing the
weight to be given to the testimony of the infant."
Other authorities assert that the examination should not take place
in the presence of the jury. They hold that the issue of competence is
a factual question reserved entirely for the court. It is not advisable
for the jury to hear often incipiently prejudicial voir dire testimony
even before it has been determined that the witness will be allowed to
testify concerning the subject of the litigation.69 It is the consensus
of these latter cases that once the matter of competency is determined,
61 RCW 5.60.020; RCW 5.60.050.
62 See State v. Gruber, 150 Wash. 66, 272 Pac. 89 (1928) ; State v. Priest, 132 Wash.
580, 232 Pac. 353 (1925) ; State v. Whitfield, 129 Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924) ; 58
Am.Jua. Witnesses § 134 (1948); 3 JONES § 758; 1 UNDERHILL § 257; 2 WIGMoRE §
508.
633 WHARTON § 740; 8 ARK. L. Rmv. 100, 101.
64 State v. Priest 132 Wash. 580, 585, 232 Pac. 353, 354 (1925) ; State v. Smith, 95
Wash. 271, 163 Pac. 759 (1917) ; 3 WHARTON § 740.
65 State v. Wilson, 156 Ohio 525, 103 N.E.2d 552, 555-56 (1952). See State v.
Whitfield, 129 Wash. 134, 224 Pac. 559 (1924). 58 Am.Jup. Witnesses § 134; 3
WARTON § 763. See also Commonwealth v. Tatisos, 238 Mass. 322, 130 N.E. 495(1921) and the interesting comparison of the judge's lengthy examination in that case
with the standard psychological intelligence-tests in Hutchins & Slesinger, The Com-
petency of Witnesses, 37 YALe L.J. 1017 (1928).66 State v. Gruber, 150 Wash. 66, 74-75, 272 Pac. 89, 92 (1928) ; State v. Priest,
132 Wash. 580, 232 Pac. 353 (1925) ; 58 Am.Jua. Witnesses § 134; 3 JoiEs § 758; 8
ARK. L. REv. 100, 101-02; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217-18.
67 58 Am.Jua. Witnesses § 134; 3 WHARToN § 763.
68 58 AM.JUR. Witnesses § 134; 3 JoNEs § 759.
69 See State v. Moorison, 43 Wn.2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953). (Competency of a
witness previously declared insane.). Accord, Radiant Oil Co. v. Herring, 146 Fla. 154,
200 So. 376 (1941) ; McGuire v. People, 44 Mich. 286, 6 N.W. 669 (1880) ; Lo Biondo
v. Allan, 132 N.J.L. 437, 40 A.2d 810 (1945) ; 8 ARK. L. REv. 100, 101-02.
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the testimony of the child should be presented to the jury in the same
manner, subject to the same limitations, and the same attacks on credi-
bility as any other testimony."0
This problem has not been resolved in Washington. However, where
the preliminary examination is conducted prior to swearing of the
youngster, it is done in part to determine whether he can in fact take
an oath. Thus, if the preliminary examination is conducted in the
presence of the jury, and if the child is later permitted to testify, the
trial court would be guilty of having permitted the jury to determine
the credibility of a witness based partially upon unsworn testimony.
The Washington court has frowned upon the receiving of unsworn
testimony of children. 1 Thus, the best procedure is to require that the
preliminary examination be conducted out of the presence of the jury."2
This procedure was suggested by the court in State v. Moorison73
when the competency of a witness was challenged under RCW
5.60.050, on the ground of prior insanity. The suggested procedure
will not prevent an attack upon the child's credibility in the usual
manner. Likewise, it will not prevent re-asking of many questions
formerly used on voir dire.4
What should the preliminary examination encompass?
Three problems confront an attorney who is involved in a prelim-
inary hearing to determine the competency of a child witness. First,
what are the elements of competency? Second, how does one set the
stage for his witness to meet the test? Third, what subjects should be
touched upon to establish the necessary elements?
The test of a child's competency involves four fundamental ele-
ments:7 1 "(1) present understanding or intelligence to understand,
on instruction, an obligation to speak the truth; (2) mental capacity at
the time of the occurrence in question to observe and register such
occurrence; (3) memory sufficient to retain an independent recollec-
70 Once the question of competency has been determined, the young person's testi-
mony is placed on the same footing as an adult. Thus, there should be no special
cautionary instructions given by the court. In fact. such an instruction would undoubt-
edly violate WASH. CoNST. art. IV, § 16. See State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 269,
174 Pac. 9, 10 (1918). Contra, J. F. STEPHEN, op. cit. supra note 52 at 288.
71 Hodd v. Tacoma, 45 Wash. 436, 438-39, 88 Pac. 842, 843 (1907).
72 State v. Moorison, 43 Wn.2d 23, 259 P.2d 1105 (1953).
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.75 Robinson v. State, 235 Miss. 100, 108 So.2d 583 (1959) ; Burnam v. Chicago Great
Western Ry. Co., 340 Mo. 25, 100 S.W.2d 858, 862 (1936) ; 6 Au.JuR. PROOF OF FACTS,




tion of the observations made;1 and (4) capacity truly to translate
into words the memory of such observations."
The examination should be as friendly as possible. The questions
should be simple and direct and designed to ascertain the general
intelligence of the child and his recognition of a duty to speak the
truth. If necessary, questions answerable by simple affirmatives and
negatives may be used. In any case, the questions should be kept
within the grasp of the child's mind. 7
The interrogators should remember that questions which appear
simple and direct to them may be confusing or absolutely meaningless
to a child. A six-year-old child might give an unsatisfactory answer
if asked, "With whom do you reside?" However, he could readily
answer, "With whom do you live?" He might have similar trouble with
the word "prevaricate" and yet would be able to correctly tell the
difference between the "truth" and a "lie."
The importance of speaking a youngster's language is well illustrated
in State v. Collier." Butch, a nine year old boy, was asked: "Who is
God?" He was wholly unable to deal with the question except to say:
"I know he never told a lie." In determining that the child was compe-
tent to testify, the court said: "We may observe, parenthetically, that
a good many adults would have some difficulty with that question."
If it appears that the child actually possesses the knowledge but is
unable to express it on a single point, or if the child and interrogator
reach an actual impasse in communication, it may be advisable to pass
over the immediate problem and substitute other questions to demon-
strate his competency. Competency will seldom be determined by an
answer to a single question."
The basic reason for a preliminary hearing is to establish a child's
competency as a witness. However, it fulfills another important func-
tion. If properly handled, the time spent on the stand prior to actual
appearance before the jury can be used constructively to put the child
at ease in an otherwise strange atmosphere. On the other hand, if the
situation is handled improperly, the child's confidence (and thus his
76 Where the child's testimony will relate to facts and circumstances that took place
a long time prior to trial, it should be established that the child remembers other things
that happened at or about the same time. This will help determine whether the child
was too immature at the time of the happening to recall the events. It should also help
gauge his ability to recall. 6 AM.Jul. PRooF, Infants at 335, 342.
7
7 Jackson v. State, 239 Ala. 38, 193 So. 417, 419 (1940).
78 State v. Collier, 23 Wn.2d 678, 687, 162 P.2d 267, 272 (1945).
79 See State v. Collier, supra note 78; Davenport v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 628, 148
S.W.2d 1054 (1941) ; Pierce v. New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 86 R.I. 326, 134 A.2d
421 (1957) ; 6 Am.Jua. PROOF, Infants at 335.
[VCOL. 37
THE CHILD AS A WITNESS
effectiveness as a witness) may be destroyed before the jury ever has
an opportunity to see him.
Most adults are uneasy and tense in the unfamiliar surroundings of
a courtroom. This reaction can be magnified many-fold with a young-
ster. He is confronted with a new and different world occupied exclu-
sively by adults who use a strange vocabulary. Thus, it is incumbent
upon both court and counsel to put him at ease so that the information
he possesses can be imparted to the jury in the most readily under-
standable fashion.
The preliminary examination should begin with informal questions
of a general nature. This will make it easier for the youngster to talk.
These questions may range over a wide area and yet, indirectly, pro-
duce important information on the subject of competency. For
instance:
Q. What is your name?
A. Katherine Anne Craig.
Q. How are you feeling today, Katherine?
A. Fine.
Q. What are the names of your mother and father?
A. -- -
Q. Do you have any brothers and sisters?
Q. What are their names?
Q. Do they live at home?
Q. By the way, how do you spell your name?
Q. How old are you, Katherine?
Q. When is your birthday?
Q. How did you get here today?
Q. Do you know what building you are in now?
Q. What town are you in now?
Q. Where do you live?
Q. What schmol do you go to?
Q. How far do you live from school?
All of the foregoing questions should be easy to answer and thus
should help relax the child. However, critical examination will also
reveal that they help establish:
(1) Ability to understand simple questions. (2) Age, as well as the
child's knowledge of his own age and birthdate. (3) His residence
19621
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and the location of his home in relation to another important place.
This also helps illustrate his ability to observe and relate what he
observes. (4) Knowledge of other people who live with him. (5)
Ability to remember. (6) General intelligence. The foregoing ques-
tions also form a good base from which the interrogrator may, with
ease, branch off into other important questions.
It is assumed that the attorney who offers a child as a witness will
have talked with him before placing him on the stand.8 Before he
ever brings him to court, the attorney should know something of the
child's background and should have formed some opinion as to his
competency and his ability to answer necessary questions. With this
knowledge at his fingertips, counsel should be in a position to formu-
late his own questions. For this reason, no attempt will be made to
outline specific questions to assist in establishing a young person's
competency as a witness. Each child differs in age, personality, back-
ground and intelligence. All questions must be tailored to the in-
dividual involved. However, there are certain topics that should be
covered to established competency:
1. General questions about the home and members of the family;
2. Questions about his schooling, including his grade, present teachers,
former teachers, subjects studied, class standing, grades received
in former years, regularity of promotion, failures, if any, favorite
subjects, attendance record and extra-curricular activities. If the
child is of pre-school age, or is very young, he should also be tested
on his ability to count, read and spell simple words; 8"
3. Questions about his attendance at church or sunday school, includ-
ing his frequency of attendance, names of his teachers, pastor and
location of the church; 2
4. Questions to demonstrate his knowledge of the difference between
so Many attorneys feel that it is advisable to tell the child something about what to
expect in the courtroom. By so doing, the youngster will not be completely lost when
he takes the stand. Some lawyers actually take a child-witness to an empty courtroom
in advance of trial. This helps the youngster familiarize himself with the surroundings.
816 Aw.JuR. PROOF, Infants at 338.
82 Such questions would not appear to violate the child's rights under the WASH.
CONST. art I, § 11, amend. 34. Accord, State v. Leuch, 198 Wash. 331, 333-37, 88 P.2d
440, 441-42 (1939). That case dealt with the subject of "competency" and "religious
faith" of a juror. However, it is felt that the same general principle would apply to
questions touching upon religion as they relate to a child's understanding of the
difference between the truth and a lie, and the obligation to testify truthfully. See
Commonwealth v. Myers, 189 Pa. Super. 198, 150 A.2d 380, 382 (1959); 6 AM.JuR.
PROOF, Infants at 343.
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the truth and a falsehood, that it is wrong to lie and the consequen-
ces of telling a lie;8" and
5. Lastly, the child should be asked some questions to dispel the possi-
bility of coaching. A child that has been coached is suspect. In
this regard, the following type of questions would be appropriate:
Q. Have we met before, Katherine?
A. Yes.
Q. Where?
A. At your office.
Q. When was that?
A. Last Saturday.
Q. Was anyone else in the room?
A. Yes.
Q. Who?
A. My dad and my sister Joan.
Q. What did we talk about?
A. About what I'd seen at the wreck.
Q. Did I tell you about the wreck, or did you tell me?
A. I told you.
Q. Did I tell you what to say in court?
A. Yes.
Q. What did I tell you to say?
A. To tell everything I know.
Q. Did I tell you anything else?
A. You said to tell the truth.
THE OATH
All children, regardless of age, must be sworn once they have been
found competent to testify. 4 This fact has given rise to the argument
that child under the age of eight may not properly qualify as a witness
even though otherwise competent. It is contended that one reason for
the oath is to subject one to the criminal penalty of perjury for false
swearing." It is then pointed out that RCW 9.01.111 provides that
children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing a
crime. From this foothold, it is contended that inasmuch as a child of
eight cannot commit or be punished for the crime of perjury, he can-
83 It is not necessary for a child to be able to explain the legal nature of an oath.
State v. Collier, 23 Wn.2d 678, 686-94, 162 P.2d 267, 272-75 (1945) ; People v. Delaney,
52 Cal. App. 765, 199 Pac. 896 (1921) ; 3 WHART N § 762; 8 Anc. L. Rav. 100, 101-04.8 4 Hodd v. Tacoma, 45 Wash. 436, 438-39, 88 Pac. 842, 843 (1907).
835 58 Am.Jun. Witnesses § 132; 1 UxDEnamL.T § 251; 8 Ann. L. Ray. 100, 103-105.
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not properly take an oath86 and, thus, cannot testify. Although the
Washington court has not decided this question, most states have
resolved this interesting argument in favor of the child's competency
if he is otherwise competent 7
It is not necessary that he have any particular religious or moral
background." However, it is essential that he appreciate the obligation
of an oath.89 It is sufficient to qualify him that he understand the
difference between truth and falsehood, and his duty to tell the truth,
and that he will be punished if he testifies falsely." It is not neces-
sary that he understand the legal nature of an oath or appreciate the
formality of taking it as long as he has an adequate sense of the im-
propriety of falsehood. In other words, he need not be able to define
an oath, perjury or testimony.9 Furthermore, if the child does not
seem to actually understand the significance of taking an oath, it is
within the discretion of the court to momentarily postpone the trial
for the purpose of such instruction.2
No particular words or form need be used in administering the oath.
Article I, § 6, of the Washington Constitution provides: "The mode of
administering an oath or affirmation shall be such as may be most con-
sistent with and binding upon the conscience of the person to whom
such oath, or affirmation, may be administered." The constitution thus
gives a wide discretion as to the mode of administering an oath. The
administering officer is commanded to employ that mode which he
believes will be most binding upon the conscience of the witness. It has
been held that RCW 5.28.020, which sets out the manner of administer-
ing an oath, is permissive only. 3
86 RCW 9.01.111.
8758 Am.JuR. Witnesses § 132; 1 UNDERHILL § 251; 3 WHARTON § 762; 8 ARK.
L. REv. 100, 103-05; Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1102 (1945). Criminal offenses of very young
children are first handled in juvenile court under the provisions of the Washington
State Juvenile Code, RCW 13.04. When thus handled, the offense is not considered a
criminal conviction, even if the offense is perjury, RCW 13.04.240. The Washington
court has not decided whether a child's competency is affected by the fact that prosecu-
tion for perjury is subject primarily to juvenile court proceedings. However, most
of the cases that have considered the matter have determined that the child's com-
petency is not affected. Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1102, 1104 (1945).
88 58 Am.JuR. Witnesses § 130, 131; 8 ARx. L. Rur. 100, 103-105.
89 State v. Collier, 23 Wn.2d 678, 686-94, 162 P.2d 267, 272-75 (1945) ; 58 Am. JUR.
Witnesses § 130, 131; 3 WHARTON § 762; 8 ARK. L. REv. 100, 103-105; 10 Wyo. L.J.
214, 217-18.
90 State v. Collier, supra note 89; 58 Am.JuR. Witnesses § 130; 1 UwNmHERiL 257;
10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 217-18.
9' State v. Collier, supra note 90; People v. Delaney, 52 Cal. App. 765, 199 Pac. 896
(1921); 3 WHARTON § 762; 8 ARK. L. REv. 100, 101-05.
9258 Am.JuR. Witnesses § 133; 8 ARK. L. Ray. 100, 101-02.
93 State v. Collier, 23 Wn2d 678, 686-94, 162 P.2d 267, 272-75 (1945); RCW
5.28.030.
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This means that it is not necessary to use the words "oath" or
cswear"; or any other particular words or form as long as the youngster
is made to understand the necessity of telling the truth. Merely to
ask the child if he will "promise" to tell the truth is sufficient if it fits
the understanding of the child.9"
LATITUDE OF THE EXAmINATON
Direct Examination
After the child has been qualified, his examination should be care-
fully conducted and kept within the range of his mind.9 5 He may
know and be able to tell many facts, and yet be wholly in the dark as
to other matters open to a more mature mind." He should not be
permitted to answer questions which he might not in actuality under-
stand." This is particularly true where leading questions are used. 8
For instance, it is doubtful that girl of eight should be permitted to
answer "yes" to the question "[D]id he have sexual intercourse with
you?"9 While an adult might understand the question, there is the
danger that the child might not know the meaning of the words and be
led into making a false answerY °
This is especially true in cases which involve a morals offense against
a child of tender years. By reason of the nature of the details, there is
a natural reticence to ask a young person to speak out in detail. How-
ever, the delicacy of the situation should not be permitted to out-
weigh the fact that a man's liberty and reputation are at stake. The
consequential embarrassment to the interrogator and the child is a
small price to pay for proof that the witness understands the details
94 State v. Collier, supra note 93.
095 6 AM.JUR. PROOF, Infants at 335; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 219-21; See note 44 supra,.9 Jackson v. State, 239 Ala. 38, 193 So. 417 (1940) ; 6 Am.Jmu PROOF, Infants at
335.97 Riggs v. State, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1956); 3 WHARTON § 762
(Supp. 1960 at 8).
08 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 97, § 762; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 220.
99 Riggs v. State, 235 Ind. 499, 135 N.E.2d 247, 249 (1956) ; 3 WHARTON, op. cit.
supra note 97, § 762.
100 Riggs v. State, supra note 99. In that case a 12-year-old child was asked "Did
you have sexual intercourse with Hiram Riggs?" She answered in the affirmative. This
statement was the sole direct testimony that the defendant had committed the crime.
There was no evidence that the child understood the legal significance of "sexual inter-
course" or what particular acts were necessary to constitute it. She related no details
with reference to the acts comprising her conclusion. Concerning this, the court said:
"A child of 12 is not competent to give her conclusion of 'sexual intercourse' without
showing her understanding of details supporting such conclusion, while at the same
time a more mature person with more knowledge of such matters might be qualified."
Cf., Flinn v. State, 188 Ind. 531, 124 N.E. 875 (1919). In that case, the child testified
to having "sexual intercourse." However, the record disclosed that she understood the
meaning of the term and the answer was not criticized.
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upon which his conclusion is based.1 ' On the other hand, a youngster's
own simple words often paint a more vivid and convincing picture for
the jury than testimony rephrased in the nicety of legal terminology." 2
Thus, insofar as possible, the child should be permitted to tell his
story in his own language, or at least in language he understands.
It may be necessary to use leading questions from time to time.
In this regard, the State of Washington has held that, with witnesses
of tender years, wide latitude is allowed in their examination. 103 How-
ever, even though leading questions are the prevailing method of
obtaining evidence from a child, they should be avoided whenever
possible.0 " By leading a child, an attorney may elicit what he thinks
the child saw and heard rather than what the child actually saw and
heard.' Also, there is the danger of having perfectly accurate testi-
mony discounted by the court or the jury because it was elicited by the
use of leading questions.0 6
Wigmore recognizes the childish disposition to weave romance and
to treat imagination for verity as well as the rooted ingenuousness of
children and their tendency to speak straightforwardly what is in their
minds. He suggests that the sensible way is simply to put the child on
the stand and let him tell his story for what it may be worth. 0 As yet,
no state court has gone this far although many, including our own,
hold that the latitude of a child's examination is within the discretion
of the trial court.' It is felt that it is more prudent to recognize the
fact that many children are more impressionable than adults.' Thus,
101 Ibid.
102 A youngster's graphic description of a particularly sordid morals offense does
more than merely illustrate a knowledge of details that support his conclusions. Such
testimony also makes a greater impact upon the minds of the jurors than an attorney's
professionally dry-cleaned version. The author recalls a criminal action in which a
prominent citizen was charged with a disgusting morals offense involving three young
boys. The prosecuting attorney attempted to censor the version of the story related
by the first two boys. The faces of the jury indicated that they were completely uncon-
vinced. Feeling that there was nothing to lose, the prosecuting attorney permitted the
third youngster to tell the story in his own way in his own words. The jury's reaction
was almost electric. The facts were so sordid and disgusting in the uncensored version
that one of the jurors almost became ill. The tide of the trial turned when the child
was permitted to use a language with which he was familiar.
103 State v. Davis, 20 Wn.2d 443, 444-46, 147 P.2d 940, 942 (1944) ; State v. Tenny,
137 Wash. 47, 241 Pac. 669 (1925) ; State v. Hanson, 133 Wash. 527, 234 Pac. 28
(1925) ; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 218-20.
104 Jackson v. State, 239 Ala. 38, 193 So. 417 (1940) ; 6 Am.Jtm. PRooF, Infants at
335; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 219-20.
lot Ibid.
1o Macale v. Lynch, 110 Wash. 444, 188 Pac. 517 (1920) ; 10 Wyo. L.J. 214, 220.
107 2 WIG11Ro § 509.
1o State v. Davis, 20 Wn.2d 443, 444-46, 147 P.2d 940, 942 (1944) ; State v. Tenny.
137 Wash. 47, 241 Pac. 669 (1925).
109 See H. E. BurTr, APPLIED PSYCHOLMGY at 307 (1948) wherein the following
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the court's discretion should be exercised with care, and with under-
standing of the individual child's capability to understand the questions
and to give intelligent, comprehensible answers.
Cross-Examination
The right of cross-examination is an important tool in the hands of a
skillful attorney. However, it is frequently impotent in eliciting the
truth from a child who speaks what is in his mind as his impression of
the truth."' For this reason, the scope, extent and limitation of the
cross-examination is left largely to the discretion of the trial court."'
Usually great latitude is allowed in the cross-examination of
minors." 2 However, the trial court may confine the examination within
reasonable limits and may curtail one that is unduly protracted, frivo-
lous, repetitious or concerned with irrelevant matters."' The interro-
gator is not prohibited from re-asking many of the questions posed
during the child's voir dire examination on competency.', In fact, such
a re-examination may frequently prove quite fruitful. Furthermore,
once the child has taken the stand, before the jury, he is on the same
footing as any other witness subject to cross-examination. His credi-
bility may be attacked in the same manner."
interesting observation is made: "Suggestion is especially apt to play a role in the
testimony of children because they are more suggestible than adults. In simple tests
where a picture is shown and tricky questions are asked about it, seven-year-old children
accept about 50 per cent of the suggestions, whereas eighteen-year-olds accept only 20
percent of the same suggestions. It is possible to go into one of the lower school grades
with a bottle of distilled water, tell the pupils that you want to see who has the keenest
smell and that after the stopper is removed they are to raise a hand as soon as they
smell anything. In a few moments most of the hands in the room will be up. On one such
occasion, a little girl became sick from the odor of the distilled water." See also note
52 supra. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that one of the most valuable
tools in the cross-examination of adults is the same power of suggestion just mentioned.
All attorneys have seen adult witnesses positively determine which of two bottles con-
tain gasoline or whisky or some other liquid only to find that both contain water. The
same approach has been used with equal success for measurements, dates and colors.
Thus, it can be seen that suggestibility is not a weakness peculiar to children. At least,
by comparison with an adult, the testimony of a child is more apt to be free of prejudice
or sinister motives. 3 JoNEs § 760. See also State v. Jackson, 121 Kan. 711, 249 Pac.
688, 689-90 (1926). (excellent satire on adult witnesses swayed by sinister motives)
110 See notes 52 and 53 supra.
"'2 CONRAD, MODERN TRAL EViDENCE § 1184 (1956) [hereinafter cited as 2
CONRAD]; 3 WHARTON § 861.
112 People v. Voice, 68 Cal. App. 2d 610, 157 P.2nd 436 (1945) ; 2 CoNRAD 1184.
"13 State v. Steik, 161 Wash. 194, 296 Pac. 546 (1931); 2 CoNRAD 1184; 3 WHARTON
861.
"l See note 74 supra.116 A witness may be impeached by proving a prior conviction. This may be done
by the record thereof, a duly authenticated copy of the record, cross-examination or
other competent evidence. RCW 10.52.030. Such impeachment is permitted whether
the previous conviction is a felony or a misdemeanor. State v. Maloney, 135 Wash.
309, 237 Pac. 726 (1925); State v. Overland, 68 Wash. 566, 123 Pac. 1011 (1912).
However, a youngster who has appeared in juvenile court and who has been declared
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The cross-examination of a young person presents a number of
difficulties because he has a number of natural defenses that an adult
does not. The fact that a very young child appears defenseless gives
rise to a feeling of sympathy on the part of the jury. Also, a parent's
natural, protective instinct is a factor that must not be overlooked in
the minds of jurors who have children. If a child is small for his age
and is particularly cute, an attorney is faced with what appears to be a
very precocious youngster. Unfortunately, the lawyer is forced into
an undesirable battle of wits with a witness who has a near-adult mind
in a child's body. The interrogator is immediately placed on the horns
of a dilemma. If he attempts to emphasize the youngster's actual
age, experience and sophistication to combat the appearance of preco-
ciousness, he also emphasizes the competency of the child. In such a
situation, the jury frequently sides with the child in amused enjoy-
ment over the attorney's consternation.
The cross-examiner should never attack the child rudely and should
avoid any appearance of attempted "bullying." An attack that seems
to be overly tricky or unfair will build up a feeling of resentment in
the minds of the jury. Thus, an attorney who has an opportunity to
demolish the testimony of a child-witness should do so courteously.
An excellent example of such an examination occurred in the
author's court a few years ago. The attorney was confronted with a
youngster whose testimony was the very foundation of his opponent's
case. The witness had done well on direct examination and the jury
was obviously impressed. The boy was small in stature, clean-cut,
handsome, well-mannered, and he wore a high school letterman's
sweater with two stripes. The lad was asked a few questions about
his direct examination. He gave no ground, and the matter was
dropped. The attorney then concluded his examination in a courteous
and kindly manner as follows:
Q. What did you say your age is?
A. Fourteen.
Q. Are you attending school right now?
to be a "dependent" or "delinquent" child has tot beet convicted of a crime, even
though the basis of his legal status is a criminal act. RCW 13.04.240. The Washing-
ton court has not passed on the question yet. However, it would appear that a child
cannot be impeached by questions pertaining to an appearance in juvenile court, or
orders resulting therefrom. The right to impeach is based strictly upon convctons
and a declaration of "dependency" or "delinquency" is not a conviction. On the other
hand, if the attorney who calls a child as a witness asks it questions pertaining to a
prior juvenile record, a different rule is involved. In such a case, the attorney has
opened the door to a searching cross-examination at least as broad as the questions on
direct examination.
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A. Yes.
Q. How are you getting along in school?
A. Not too well.
Q. I see you are wearing a letterman's sweater. What do the stripes
mean?
A. The stripes show how many letters a fellow has.
Q. Do you mean those stripes on your sweater signify that you
earned a letter in some sport?
A. Yes.
Q. What sport did you win your letters in?
A. None.
Q. Do you mean you didn't earn any letters at all?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. How did you get the sweater then?
A. Anyone can buy them.
Q. Did you buy your sweater?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, , when you wear that sweater with the stripes,
isn't it the same as saying-"I won a letter in two high school sports?"
A. Yes.
Q. But when you wear that sweater, you aren't actually telling
the truth, are you?
A. No.
Q. When you wore that sweater on the stand today, you really told
this jury that you were a high school letterman, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. But it is not true, is it?
A. No, it is not.
Q. The jury might never have found out about it if you and I
hadn't straightened it out here, would they?
A. No, they wouldn't.
The result of the examination was devastating. The boy was dis-
credited in the eyes of the jury by a courteous cross-examination by an
attorney with his eyes open.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Some authors and a few state courts are so impressed with the
unreliability of children's testimony that they suggest the necessity of
a special instruction for the jury. They contend that the jury should
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be advised to give special attention to the youngster's testimony
because of a tendency of children to imagine, misunderstand and
fabricate. It is said that the jury should give less weight to such
testimony, or at least consider these drawbacks when weighing a child's
testimony.1 '
Although the Washington court has not ruled upon the exact sub-
ject, a similar cautionary instruction was rejected in the case of a
witness who a dope addict." 7 The court held that:
While testimony is admissible showing the character of, or effect of
the use of drugs upon a witness as affecting her credibility, it is not
proper for the court to violate the constitutional prohibition against
commenting upon the evidence by instructing the jury that it should
regard the testimony of any class of witnesses with caution or sus-
picion."" (Emphasis added)
It is likely that the Washington court will be consistent in its
interpretation of the above-mentioned constitutional prohibition,
insofar as the child-witness is concerned." 9 Once the matter of com-
petency has been decided by the court, the question of credibility is
strictly for the jury.
CONCLUSION
When faced with the problem of examining a child-witness, too
many attorneys throw up their hands in despair. This defeatist outlook
has nullified the effectiveness of many good witnesses just as it has
permitted the testimony of numerous incompetent children to go to
the jury. Actually the problem is more apparent than real. It arises
mostly from non-critical thinking that attributes to the youngster some
kind of super-legal status in the scheme of things. Unfortunately, few
articles have discussed the subject, and the case authority in the State
of Washington is sparse. Thus, there are few guide lines for the busy
practitioner. This article was written in an attempt to chart a few
paths through an area clouded with misconception. Only a summary
of the problems can be presented in this article, and only a few exam-
ples can be given as an aid to resolving these problems. By so doing,
it is hoped that some unnecessary pitfalls inherent in the use of child-
witnesses may be avoided.
116 See note 52 supra.
117 State v. Smith, 103 Wash. 267, 174 Pac. 9 (1918) (competency of a dope addict).
See State v. Siebenbaum, 105 Wash. 157, 177 Pac. 669 (1919).
118 State v. Snith, supra note 117, at 269, 174 Pac. at 9, 10.
119 WAsHr. CONST., art. IV, § 16.
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